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Abstract
We consider a Burdett and Mortensen style wage posting model with
aggregate shocks. We analyze the equilibrium under two alternative
assumptions on wage setting in ongoing jobs: either fully flexible or
downwardly rigid. In the model firms optimally pay only retention pre-
miums. The equilibrium is characterized by a Taylor expansion. The
model yields two simultaneous relations for wages and quits, of which
the parameters are simple functions of three empirically observable ar-
rival rates of: (i) jobs, (ii) lay offs, and (iii) aggregate shocks. Hence,
there are overidentifying restrictions, which are supported remarkably
well by the data. We find strong evidence for wage downward rigidity
and inefficiently low job-to-job transitions during the downturn. Fur-
thermore, we find evidence that firms pay only retention premiums,
not hiring premiums. A model with wage rigidity in ongoing jobs and
OJS is therefore a useful benchmark for a wage equation in macro
models.
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1 Introduction
Are wages rigid, and if so, why? There is a large literature that suggests
so and that provides insights into why this is the case, e.g. Baker et al.
(1994), Campbell and Kamlani (1997), Card and Hyslop (1997), Bewley
(1999), Shimer (2004, 2005) and Hart and Moore (2008). Wage rigidity for
ongoing jobs implies that current wages are determined by the unemploy-
ment rate at the date of hiring. Bils (1985) reported that wages for new
hires are indeed more cyclical then those of job stayers. Later on, Beaudry
and DiNardo (1991) found that current wages are related to the lowest un-
employment rate since the date of hiring rather than at the date of hiring
itself. This suggests that wages are downwardly rigid, but can be increased
when that is optimal given labour market conditions. The risk that workers
might quit is an important argument for firms not to reduce wages during
a recession, next to the negative effect of wage cuts on worker moral, see
Campbell and Kamlani (1997). One would therefore expect that these find-
ings had played a major role in models with On-the-Job Search (OJS) in the
spirit Burdett and Mortensen (1998) celebrated model of wage posting, and
its later offsprings like Bontemps et al. (2000), and Gautier et al. (2010).
Wages can only be used as an effective instrument for retention when firms
can either explicitly or implicitly commit to future wage payments: when re-
ceiving an outside offer, workers will not respond to the carrot of a retention
premium if they expect firms to renege on its payment as soon as the outside
offer has been rejected. This is exactly what the concept of a posted wage
reflects: a commitment to pay a particular wage for the duration of a job.
Nevertheless, papers written in this tradition have largely ignored this issue.
We suspect that one of the reasons why the literature has largely avoided
the analysis of OJS models with this type of inefficiency is their mathemat-
ical complexity. However, we shall present evidence that there are, in fact,
considerable inefficiencies in job-to-job transitions.
The current paper fills this gap. We apply a random search model with
OJS, where the distribution of match productivity is exogenous and where
the economy switches between the up- and the downturn. The key question
is then how wages in ongoing jobs respond to this cyclical variation. We
consider two different assumptions. Under the first assumption, wages are
fully flexible. The (implicit) contract offered by the firm stipulates how the
wage will be adjusted in response to cyclical variations in the job offer arrival
rate. Our model is then almost identical to a standard wage posting model.
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Under the alternative assumption, wages can not be lowered. When
labour market conditions improve, the firm can unilaterally raise its wage
offer, since this is in the joint interest of the worker and the firm; it is in
the worker’s interest, because she receives a better pay; it is in the firm’s
interest, as it improves the trade off between the wage bill and the risk of the
worker quitting. When the job offer arrival rate goes down, the firm would
like to reduce its wage offer, as the risk of the worker quitting has decreased.
However, if the firm deviates by violating the implicit contract and sets a
lower wage, then workers are assumed to expect firms to pay the lowest wage
forever afterwards, as in Coles (2001). The worker will then quit as soon as
she receives another offer. The firm will then optimally not lower its wage
offer, leading to downward rigidity, as in Beaudry and DiNardo (1991).
The characterization of the equilibrium relies on two innovations. Firstly,
similar to Coles and Mortensen (2016), we analyze a model where wages
only affect retention and not hiring. Secondly, we approximate the loss of
downward rigidity by a second order Taylor expansion. We consider both
innovations in turn. Burdett and Mortensen (1998) assume that firms post
binding wage offers before encountering a job seeker. In that context, it is
optimal for the firm to pay both hiring and retention premiums. We follow
Gautier et al. (2010) in making a distinction between hiring and retention
premiums. Workers learn about the quality of a potential match before they
actually apply for the job. An application comes at some epsilon cost in
our model. Workers will then only apply if they expect the firm to make an
acceptable offer. Hence, the firm has no incentive to pay a hiring premium.
The fact that firms pay only retention premiums greatly simplifies the
analysis. Hiring premiums are backward looking: a firm must consider the
whole history of wage setting by its competitors to infer the effect on hir-
ing. Retention premiums, to the contrary, are forward looking: they depend
on the job offer arrival rate only. Where our assumption of firms paying
only retention premiums serves the purpose of analytical convenience, our
framework provides a test of this assumption. If firms were to pay hiring
premiums, they would have no incentive to raise wages after an increase in
the job offer arrival. After hiring, the hiring premium is a waste of money.
Hence, the hiring premium provides a buffer that should be depleted before
the increase in the optimal retention premium justifies an increase in wages.
Our evidence suggest that firms respond to even small increases in the job
offer arrival rate by increasing their wage offers, suggesting that firms do not
pay hiring premiums.
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Even with this convenient assumption, characterizing the equilibrium is
a hard problem. We use an idea by Akerlof and Yellen (1985), who apply
a Taylor expansion for the characterization of the equilibrium. While the
difference in wage offers between newly created jobs and jobs that started
before the downturn of the economy is a first order phenomenon, the dif-
ference in profitability is only a second order phenomenon. The first order
term is zero by the envelope theorem. With this trick the model allows for
a convenient decomposition of the cyclical component of wages into three
terms reflecting: (i) the change in the job offer arrival rate, (ii) the change
in the value of output, and (iii) the mitigating effect of downward rigidity
on wage increases during the upturn: when making a wage-offer during the
upturn, the firm accounts for the risk of a future downturn. The first effect
yields a unit elasticity of wages with respect to the job offer arrival rate, the
second effect leads to an even higher elasticity, while the third effect leads
to a reduction of the elasticity below unity. Empirically, the second effect
is small, since the job offer arrival rate is orders of magnitude more volatile
than the value of output. Hence, the model predicts an elasticity that is
(substantially) smaller than unity.
Estimation of these relations requires a proxy for the match quality. Here,
we use previous results discussed in Gottfries and Teulings (2016). Using
their proxy, the model generates two simple log linear equations, one for
wages and one for the quite rate. The coefficients of both equations are sim-
ple analytical functions of three arrival rates: (i) new jobs, (ii) layoffs, and
(iii) aggregate shocks. All three can be directly estimated from the data.
Applying these estimates, our two log linear equations yield five overidenti-
fying restrictions. Both equations are estimated using data from the NLSY
79. We find strong evidence for wage rigidity and inefficiently low job-to-job
transitions during the downturn. Furthermore, the overidentifying restric-
tions are supported remarkably well by the data, in particular so for the
wage equation.
Recently, there has been a lot of discussion about the proper correction
for match quality, see for example Kudlyak (2011), Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2013), Bauer and Lochner (2016), Bellou and Kaymak (2016) and Galindo da
Fonseca et al. (2016). Without a proper correction, Beaudry and DiNardo
(1991)’s conclusion that wages in ongoing jobs are determined by the lowest
unemployment rate since the date of hiring might be due to a misspecifica-
tion. Hagedorn and Manovskii find that once a proxy for match quality is
included, wages exhibit no history dependence. Using arguments discussed in
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Gottfries and Teulings (2016) we reach the opposite conclusion, see Section
3 for details. Kudlyak and Bellou and Kaymak revisit the evidence of Hage-
dorn and Manovskii (2013) and find that in a more flexible specification, a
model with history dependence fits the data best. Galindo da Fonseca et al.
emphasize that an aggregate analysis misses substantial differences across oc-
cupations. In particular, the prevalence of performance pay is an important
determinant of the cyclicality of wages.
A number of other papers include business cycle variation into a model
with OJS, for example Menzio and Shi (2011) for a model with directed
search, Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013) and Coles and Mortensen (2016)
for a model with wage posting and Lise and Robin (2017) for a model with
the sequential auctions. Our model relates most closely to Moscarini and
Postel-Vinay and Coles and Mortensen. Our innovations compared to these
papers is the inclusion of wage rigidity in a tractable way. Wage rigidity
has been introduced before in search models without OJS in the tradition
of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), see for example Shimer (2004) and Hall
(2005) and in models with OJS without an endogenous response of the quit
rate to the wage (Carlsson and Westermark, 2016; Gertler et al., 2016). In
these models, inefficiencies may arise due to excess layoffs or violations of the
Hosios condition. In our model, the job destruction rate is constant, ruling
our inefficient layoffs by assumption. Our paper features full wage flexibility
for new jobs. Inefficiencies arise in our model due to excessively low job-to-
job transitions, which can only occur in models with OJS. In turn, a low
level of job-to-job transition rates in recessions makes it less profitable to
open vacancies then. Focusing on quits rather than layoffs is consistent with
the evidence by Elsby et al. (2009), Fujita and Ramey (2009) and Shimer
(2012) that job finding explains most of the variation in unemployment. Our
empirical evidence provides strong support for an inefficiently low quit rate
in recessions. Moreover, the degree of wage flexibility for new jobs observed
in the data is consistent with the predictions of our model. Hence, we expect
a model with wage rigidity in ongoing jobs and OJS to provide a useful
benchmark for macro-economics.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical
model and characterizes its equilibrium for both versions, with flexible and
downwardly rigid wages. Section 3 lays out our methodology for testing the
model and presents our regression results. Section 4 concludes.
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2 The model
2.1 Assumptions
Our point of departure is a wage posting model with OJS. The production
structure is similar to the circular model by Marimon and Zilibotti (1999).
Both jobs and workers are points distributed uniformly on the circumference
of a circle with length 2. The quality of a potential match between a worker
and a firm is measured by the distance F between their positions on the
circumference of the circle: shorter the distance, the higher the productivity
Xt of the match. By construction, F is uniformly distributed on the unit
interval; the best possible match has F = 0 and the worst possible match
has F = 1; we shall therefore refer to F as the mismatch indicator; F is
also equal to the probability that a random job offer has lower mismatch
than the current job. Let Xt (F ) be productivity of a match with mismatch
F , where t is time; we assume Xt (F ) to be strictly decreasing and twice
differentiable. The reservation wage for unemployed job seekers is Bt. Job
seekers, either employed or unemployed, receive job offers at a rate λt.
1 We
allow λt, Xt (F ) and Bt to vary over time. More specifically, there are two
states of the economy, the upturn and the downturn. The economy switches
back and forth between both states at a rate θ. Each state is characterized
by different values for λt, Xt (F ) and Bt.
λd = λ
(
1− ∆
2
)
, λu = λ
(
1 + ∆
2
)
,
Xd(F ) = X(F )
(
1− x∆
2
)
, Xu(F ) = X(F )
(
1 + x∆
2
)
,
Bd = B
(
1− x∆
2
)
, Bu = B
(
1 + x∆
2
)
,
with t ∈ {u, d}, where u is the upturn and d the downturn, where ∆ > 0 and
x ≥ 0 are parameters. This modelling of the effect of cyclical variations is
rank preserving : the rank ordering of productivityXt (F ) for different degrees
of mismatch F and the reservation wage of unemployed job seekers remains
the same when the economy transits between the up- and the downturn.
The parameter x is the ratio of the coefficients of variation of Xt (F ) and λt.
Empirically, the coefficient of variation of the job offer arrival rate is orders
of magnitude greater than that of the value of output, hence x 1.
1In our empirical application we allow for the job offer arrival rate to differ between
employed and unemployed job seekers. In the theoretical model, this yields complications
since job-seekers give up part of the option value of search by accepting a job when on-
is less efficient than off-the-job search. We avoid these complications in our theoretical
analysis.
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This rank preserving specification implies that the match quality F is
not affected when the economy transits between the up- and the downturn;
only the productivity Xt (F ) changes from Xu (F ) to Xd (F ) or the other way
around. We assume that the surplus of employment is positive in all states,
even if we compare the output in the worst match during the downturn to
the value of leisure in the upturn Xd(1) ≥ Bu. Jobs end at an exogenous job
destruction rate δ, which we assume to be constant over time. Several authors
have analyzed what share of the cyclical variation of the unemployment rate
is due to variation in job finding rate versus variation in the separation rate
rate, see Elsby et al. (2009), Fujita and Ramey (2009) and Shimer (2012).
The estimates suggest that the job finding rate is more important than the
job destruction rate. The estimated contribution is centered around 2/3
but falls somewhat when the participation margin in included (Elsby et al.,
2015). Hence, a model that treats the job destruction rate as a time-invariant
constant still captures most of the variation. Both workers and firms discount
the future at a rate ρ. It is convenient to define χ as the sum of the job
destruction rate, the interest rate and the arrival rate of aggregate shocks
χ ≡ δ + ρ+ θ.
Let Wt (F ) be the wage offer as a function of the mismatch F , and let
Ft(W ) be the fraction of firms that a pay a wage strictly higher than W .
Hence, Ft (·) is the inverse function of Wt (·). Assuming Wt (F ) to be strictly
decreasing, these definitions imply for all F ∈ [0, 1]
Ft [Wt(F )] = F, (1)
ft [Wt(F )] = W
′
t(F )
−1,
f ′t [Wt(F )] = −W ′t(F )−3W ′′t (F ),
where ft [·] is the derivative of Ft [·]. When a firm creates a vacancy it sends
a signal about its position on the circle. When a job seeker meets a vacancy,
she observes this signal. By comparing this signal to her own position on the
circle, she can infer the mismatch F of that match. Based on this information,
she decides whether or not she will apply for the job. An application comes
at an infinitesimal small cost ε→ 0 to the job seeker. Only after application,
the firm observes the position of the job seeker on the circle. It can then
infer the mismatch F . However, this information is non-observable by the
job seeker. Unlike in the standard models by Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
and Bontemps et al. (2000), firms can therefore not commit to a binding wage
offer contingent on the mismatch F prior to the application of the worker.
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The firm could always renege on this posted wage offer by claiming that the
match is of lower quality. Hence, it can post a wage only after the worker
and the firm have met.
Since a job-seeker can infer the match quality from the signal sent by the
firm, she only applies for jobs where she expects her asset value to be higher
than in her current job (unemployed job seekers will apply to any job, since
Xt (1) ≥ Bt for all t ∈ {u, d}). The firm can infer from the job-seeker’s costly
application that she expects the value of the new job to be greater than the
value of the job she currently holds. Hence, as long as all other firms do not
pay hiring premiums, the firm can make an offer without a hiring premium
because the worker applied for the job anyway and she did not expect the
firm to pay a hiring premium in the first place. Hence, this is a sub-game
perfect equilibrium. The firm does not have to worry about the job-seeker
rejecting its offer since in equilibrium only those job seekers apply who will
accept the offer anyway. There are other equilibria, for example where all
firms paying hiring premiums. Then, job seekers expect firms to pay hiring
premiums. Hence, some applicants will reject offers that do not include a
hiring premium, which makes such an offer not best response of the firm.
However, the paper focuses on the equilibrium without hiring premiums.
In equilibrium, firms do not have an incentive to signal another than
their true position on the circle, since by mis-signaling some job seekers do
not apply who would have accepted the firm’s wage offer, while some other
job seekers do apply, who will in the end reject the firm’s wage offer, since it
is lower than she had expected.
When workers decide on whether or not to accept an outside offer, they
have to form beliefs about the firm’s future wage policy. Since workers do
not observe the match quality F , they have to base their beliefs about this
future wage policy on the current wage offered by the firm.2 We consider
two different assumptions about workers’ beliefs the first, as in Coles and
Mortensen (2016), leading to full flexibility of wages in ongoing jobs in re-
sponse to aggregate shocks and the second leading to downward wage rigidity.
In both cases all future wage expectations change in response to a change in
the wage.
In the first version, workers expect firms to continue paying the current
2The worker could also base it beliefs on the signal on match quality provided by the
firm. We assume that if this signal and the actual wage policy are inconsistent, then the
worker bases its beliefs on the actual wage only and ignore the firm’s prior signal.
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wage as long as the aggregate state of the labour market remains the same.
As soon as the aggregate state changes, workers expect firms to reoptimize.
After this reoptimization, workers again expect firms to continue paying the
new reoptimized wage until the aggregate state changes again, when firms
are expected to reoptimize again.
In the second version, workers expect firms not to reduce the current
wage at any time in the future. If a firm deviates from this belief by reducing
its wage offer today, the worker expects the firm to deviate in the future by
paying only the reservation wage of an unemployed job seeker, Bt. Hence, the
worker will accept any outside offer that comes in today that pays slightly
more than Bt. Since the worker accepts any outside offer that pays more
than Bt after a slight downward deviation of the firm today anyway, it does
not make sense for the firm to pay more than Bt after today. Hence, the
worker’s and the firm’s out-of-equilibrium beliefs form a consistent set of
best responses. Given these beliefs, the firm does not find it attractive to
reoptimize its wage offer when the economy enters the downturn since it
would undermine the credibility of retention premium. Hence, wages are
downwardly rigid.
In this paper, the firm can continuously adjusts the wage but workers are
unable to observe mismatch. Contrary to these assumption, Gottfries (2017)
considers a model where workers do observe match quality F but wages are
infrequently renegotiated. In that case, a deviation of the firm only changes
the expected wage for the duration of the contract as the worker rationally
expects the firm to use the actual value of F when deciding on its optimal
offer. Hence, if workers were to observe F , firms would only be able to pay
retention premiums by using a wage contract as commitment device. That
is also their optimal strategy (Gottfries, 2017).
The empirical evidence provided by Campbell and Kamlani (1997) and
Bewley (1999) suggests that firms are indeed reluctant to reduce wages dur-
ing to the downturn to avoid a weakening of worker moral. Several other
theoretical models predict this type of response of firms. Hart and Moore
(2008) argue that workers do not have to quit the firm for retaliation after a
disputed wage cut. They can retaliate at zero cost by working to rule. In a
world with fully flexible wages, workers have to form beliefs about the firm’s
future offers. Coles (2001) considers a model where a slight deviation dras-
tically changes workers beliefs and hence, the equilibrium does not unravel,
in contrast to Gottfries (2017) where beliefs only change during the contract
length and the equilibrium unravels.
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The next two subsections characterize the wage setting policy and the
asset values of the firm and the worker for both versions of the model.
2.2 Flexible wages
Since firms reoptimize their wage offer after a change in the aggregate state
of the labour market, t ∈ {u, d}, the optimal wage offer of other firms is a
function of t. The asset value of a filled job for the firm, Πot (F,W ), as a
function of the wage and the worker, V ot (W ), read
[χ+ λtFt (W )] Π
o
t (F,W ) = Xt(F )−W + θΠ−t [Ft (W )] , (2)
χV ot (W ) = W + EV
o
t (W ) + θV−t [Ft (W )] ,
for ∀F ∈ [0, 1] ,∀W ∈ [0,∞] and t ∈ {u, d}, and where
EV ot (W ) ≡ λt
∫ ∞
W
[V ot (w)− V ot (W )] dFt (w)
denotes the option vale of finding a better paying job. Since the firm’s wage
offer maximizes the value of a filled job, it satisfies
Wt (F ) = arg max
W
Πot (F,W ) . (3)
The equilibrium asset values of the worker and the firm are defined as
Πt (F ) ≡ Πot [F,Wt (F )] ,
Vt (F ) ≡ V ot [Wt (F )] ,
EVt (F ) ≡ EV ot [Wt (F )] .
We use equation (2) and (3) to characterize the market equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Characterization of the equilibrium for flexible wages
(χ+ λtF ) Πt (F ) = Xt(F )−Wt (F ) + θΠ−t(F ),
χVt (F ) = Wt (F ) + EVt (F ) + θV−t(F ),
−W ′t(F ) = λtΠt (F ) ,
Wt (1) = Bt,
qt (F ) = λtF,
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for ∀F ∈ [0, 1] and t,−t ∈ {u, d} , t 6= −t. Πt (F ) and Vt (F ) are the as-
set values of a firm and the worker; qt (F ) is the quit rate from a job with
mismatch F .
EVt (F ) ≡ λt
∫ F
0
[Vt(f)− Vt (F )] df.
The proof of this proposition follows standard arguments in the literature.
The first two equations in Proposition 1 are the Bellman equations for the
asset value of the firm and the worker respectively. The only special feature
in these equations is their final term which captures the effect of a transition
between the up- and the downturn of the economy; in that case, the firm
reoptimizes its wage offer, which then changes from Wt (F ) to W−t (F ). The
third equation is the first order condition associated with equation (3). It is
a differential equation. The fourth equation is the initial condition for this
differential equation: the wage in the least productive job with mismatch
F = 1 is equal to the reservation wage of an unemployed.
We make four observations regarding this equilibrium, all well understood
in the literature on this type of models
1. All job transitions in this model are efficient, that is, workers exploit
all available opportunities to move to more productive jobs;
2. Workers accept a wage offer if and only if it is higher than their current
wage;
3. The wage offer distribution can be calculated without reference to the
asset value of the worker;
4. The wage offer distribution can be calculated separately for each state
of aggregate labour market conditions.
2.3 Downwardly rigid wages
Downwardly rigid wages lead to a slight change in the conditions for a market
equilibrium. As before, when the economy transits from the down- to the
upturn, firms reoptimize their wage offer. However, downward rigidity of
wages does not allow firms to reduce their offer when the economy transits
back from the up- to the downturn. Hence, the wage is the maximum of the
current wage and the ideal reoptimized wage. For the sake of simplicity, we
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focus on the case where ∆ = (λu − λd) /λ is small, so that Wu (F ) ≤ Xd (F )
for all F and the continuation of the employment relation remains profitable
for all firms, even when wages are downwardly rigid. Proposition 2 below
can be adapted to allow for the case Wu (F ) > Xd (F ) for some F , but that
would complicate the model.
Proposition 2 Characterization of the market equilibrium for downwardly
rigid wages.
(χ+ λdF ) Πd(F ) = Xd(F )−Wd(F ) + θΠu(F ), (4)
(χ+ λuF ) Πu(F ) = Xu(F )−Wu(F ) + θΠod [F,Wu (F )],
−W ′d(F ) = λdΠd(F ),
−W ′u(F ) = λuΠu(F )− θ ∂Πod(F,W )/∂W |W=Wu(F ) W ′u(F ),
Wt(1) = Bt,
qt (F ) = λtF,
for ∀F ∈ [0, 1], t ∈ {u, d} and ∀W ∈ [0,∞), where V od+ (W ) is the asset value
of a worker holding a job during the downturn while the wage has been set in
the upturn; qd+ (F ) is the quit rate from that job.
V od+ [Wd+ (W )] = V
o
d (W ) , (5)
Wd+ (W )−W = θ (V ou [Wud (W )]− V ou [Wd+ (W )]) ,
Wd+ (W )−W = [χ+ λdFd (W )] [Πod (F,W )− Πod [F,Wd+ (W )]] ,
qd+ (F ) = λdFd
[
W−1d+ (Wu)
]
,
Wud [Wd (F )] ≡ Wu (F ) ,
The functions V ot (W ) and Π
o
d (F,W ) are defined in equation (2).
The proof of this proposition follows from the arguments discussed be-
low. The equations (4) are a straightforward extension of Proposition 1. The
first two equations are the firms’ asset values in the down- and the upturn
respectively. The equation for the downturn is the same as in Proposition 1.
The equation for the upturn differs since wages are downwardly rigid. The
asset value Πd+(F ) in the term for the transition to the downturn accounts
for this wage rigidity. The third and fourth equations characterize the firm’s
wage setting policies. Again, the equation for the downturn is the same as
in Proposition 1. The equation for the upturn differs, as firms account for
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the risk that the economy may transit to downturn; in that case, downward
rigidity prevents them from re-optimizing their wage policy. The fifth equa-
tion is again the initial condition for the differential equations characterizing
the wage setting policies, while the sixth equation describes the quite rate.
There are two missing links in equation (4), which are dealt with in
equation (5). For the first missing link, consider a worker who holds a job in
which the wage has been set during the upturn while the economy has now
shifted to the downturn. This wage is bound by downward rigidity. Suppose
that this worker receives an outside offer W . What is the maximum value of
her current wage Wd+ (W ) for which she would accept this offer? This wage
Wd+ (W ) satisfies the condition in the first line of (5): the asset value in the
new job should be equal to the asset value in her current job. The worker will
accept any outside offer that pays more than her current wage. However, the
worker will also accept an outside offer that pays slightly less than her current
job because when the economy transits back to the upturn, the worker would
not receive a wage increase in her current job since that wage was been set
in the previous upturn, so there is no need for upward adjustment. In the
new job, she will get a wage increase, from W to Wud (W ) > W . Hence
Wd+ (W ) > W . Analogous to equation (2), V
o
d+ [Wd+ (W )] satisfies
χV od+ [Wd+ (W )] = Wd+ (W ) + EV
o
d (W ) + θV
o
u [Wd+ (W )] . (6)
This equation differs from equation (2) in two aspects. First, the term for the
change in the asset value when the economy transits to the upswing accounts
for the fact that the wage will not be increased in that case. Second, the
option value term EV od (W ) accounts for the fact that a worker will accept
jobs that offer a wage higher than W rather than higher than Wd+ (W ) > W ,
as we argued before. Combining the Bellman equations (2) and (6) and
using Vu [Fd (W )] = V
o
u [Wud (W )] yields the second equation in (5). This
equation states that from the marginal wage offer that a worker is willing to
accept the gain Wd+ (W )−W of a higher wage in the current job is equal
to the expected value gain of getting a higher wage in the new job when the
economy transits to the good state, V ou [Wud (W )]− V ou [Wd+ (W )], times the
probability θ that this will happen during the next infinitesimal time interval.
Since Wd+ (W ) > W and since V
o
u (W ) is an increasing function of W , this
implies
Wud (W ) > Wd+ (W ) > W. (7)
The wage Wd+ (W ) that makes a worker indifferent between accepting the
new job that pays W and staying in the current job must be in between the
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wage in the new job W and the wage Wud (W ) that she will earn in this new
job in case the economy transits back to the upturn.
The second missing link is the asset value Πod [F,Wd+ (W )] for a firm
employing a worker with mismatch F during downturn of which the wage
has been set during the upturn. This asset value can be solved using the
solution to the first missing link, see the third equation in (5). The right
hand side is the difference in asset values during the downturn for a new job
that offers a wage W and a new job that offers a wage Wd+ (W ), which has
been set during the upturn. By construction, a worker is equally likely to
quit from both jobs since they yield the same asset value for the worker. The
relevant quite rate is λdFd (W ). Hence, the Bellman equations for the firm’s
asset value for these two jobs imply that difference in asset values times the
transition rate χ+ λdFd (W ) is equal to the wage differential Wd+ (W )−W .
The final equation in (5) characterizes quit rate during the downturn from a
job with mismatch F where the wage has been set during the upturn. Since
this wage is higher than the current market wage for a new job with similar
mismatch, the quit rate from these jobs is lower. The worker holding such a
job gets paid a wage Wu (F ). By the definition of Wd+, the wage that matches
the asset value of that job is W−1d+ (Wu (F )). The probability that an incoming
offer pays that wage is Fd
[
W−1d+ (Wu)
]
. By equation (7) Wud (Wd (F )) =
Wu (F ) > Wd+ (Wd); hence, since W
′
d+ (W ) > 0, W
−1
d+ (Wu (F )) > Wd (F )
and Fd
[
W−1d+ (Wu (F ))
]
< Fd (Wd (F )) = F : for equal F , the quit rate during
the downturn from jobs that started during the upturn is lower than the quit
rate from similar jobs that started during the downturn.
We can now ask ourselves whether the four observations made in the
previous subsection regarding the equilibrium with flexible wages still apply
in the equilibrium with downwardly rigid wages. The answer is negative in
all four cases:
1. Are all job transitions efficient? No: in the downturn, job seekers whose
current wage is set when the economy was still in the upturn turn down
wage offers for jobs that are slightly more productive than their current
job since these jobs pay lower wages during the downturn;
2. Does the worker accepts only job offers which offer a wage higher than
their current job? No: in the downturn, a worker holding a job that
started in the upturn might accept a job that pays slightly less because
she expects the wage in this job to be raised when the economy tran-
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sits back to the upturn, while the wage in her current job will remain
unchanged;
3. Can the wage offer distribution be calculated without reference to the
workers’ asset value equation? No, during the downturn the asset value
of the worker determines how much lower a wage a worker holding a
job of which the wage is set in the upturn is willing to accept;
4. Can the wage offer determined separately for each state of aggregate
labour market conditions? No, when making its wage offer in the up-
turn, the firm has to take into account that the economy might transit
to the downturn in the future and that it will be unable in that situation
to adjust its wage offer.
Together, these four observations explain why the equilibrium with down-
wardly rigid wages is so much more difficult to characterize.
2.4 Characterization of the equilibrium
Though the equations in Proposition 2 characterize the equilibrium com-
pletely, their interpretation is difficult. Three ideas help us to overcome this
obstacle.
Our first idea is to focus on small differences ∆ = (λu − λd) /λ between
the up- and the downturn, so that we can applying Taylor expansions. We
shall show that (leaving out the argument F of all functions)
(χ− θ + λF ) Π = X−W +O (∆) , (8)
−W ′ = λΠ +O (∆)
(χ+ θ + λF ) Π∆ = xX−λFΠ−W∆+ θ
∆
(Πd+ − Πd) +O (∆) ,
−W ′∆ = λΠ∆ + λΠ−
θ
∆
Πd+WW
′
+O (∆) ,
where
Π ≡ 1
2
(Πu + Πd) , X ≡ 12 (Xu +Xd) ,
W ≡ 1
2
(Wu +Wd) ⇒ W ′ = 12 (W ′u +W ′d) ,
W∆ ≡ ∆−1 (Wu −Wd) ⇒ W ′∆ ≡ ∆−1 (W ′u −W ′d) .
The first pair of equations in (8) characterize the “average” behavior of profits
and wages throughout the business cycle. These equations are identical to
15
the equilibrium without aggregate fluctuations, θ = 0. The second pair of
equations characterize the cyclical fluctuations in profits and wages divided
by ∆. The terms λFΠ and λΠ in the third and fourth equation capture
the direct effect of the change in λt between the up- and the downturn:
λu−λd
∆
FΠ = λFΠ and likewise for λu−λd
∆
Π = λΠ.
Our second idea is to approximate, the terms Πd+ and Πd+W by Taylor
expansions, starting from the point Πd, since in this point the partial deriva-
tive with respect to W is zero due to the envelope theorem. Using this idea,
we obtain
Πod (F,W ) = Πd +
1
2
Πd+WW (W −Wd)2 +O
(
∆3
)
,
where Πd+WW is defined analogous to Πd+W . This equation can be used to
substitute for Πod (F,W ) in equation (5), which can then be solved for Πd+.
Our third idea is to focus on a particular functional form for the average
wage distribution W (F ) that fits the data well. In particular, we assume that
the wage offers are Pareto distributed, so that the log wages are exponentially
distributed with scale parameter σ, see Gottfries and Teulings (2016). The
wages and productivities are given by
W (F ) = F−σ, (9)
Π (F ) =
σ
λ
W (F )
F
.
where the second line follow from the second equation in (8). Using these
ideas, we show that log wages and the quit rate for jobs with not too large a
degree of mismatch satisfy two simple log linear relations, which are presented
in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 When wages are downwardly rigid and when W (F ) satisfies
equation (9), the wage and the quit rate satisfy
lnWt = −σ lnF + ωλ lnλt + ω lnλmax a,t +O (∆2) +O (F ) ,
ln qt = χF lnF + (1 + ζω) lnλt − ζω lnλmax a,t +O (∆2) +O (F ) ,
(10)
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a is the starting date of the current job;
λmax a,t ≡ max
τ∈[a,t]
λτ
ω ≡ 1 +
χ−θ
χ+θ
x
1 + θ
χ
(
χ−θ
χσ
+ 1
) , ζ ≡ θ
χσ
,
ωλ = 0, χF = 1.
The proof of Proposition 3 is in the Appendix.
For not too large a degree of mismatch (F is small) or cyclical variation
in the job offer arrival rate (∆ is small), log wages and the log quit rate are
linearly related to three variables:
1. log mismatch,
2. log job offer arrival rate,
3. log of the ratio of the max of this arrival rate since the date of job start
to its current value.
The six coefficients of these three variables for log wages and the log quit
rate (ω, σ, ωλ, χλ, χF , and ζ) are simple analytical functions of just five pa-
rameters: the transition rate θ of the economy between the up- and the
downswing, the job destruction rate δ, the discount rate ρ, the ratio x of
the coefficients of variation of λt and Xt, and the Pareto parameter σ of the
wage offer distribution. The job offer arrival rate and the job destruction rate
are identified by the transition rate from unemployment to employment and
vice versa. Our calculation yields an average monthly job finding rate from
unemployment of 40% and a job destruction rate of about 2% per month,
so that the steady state unemployment rate is 5%. The length of a business
cycle identifies the transition rate for the economy, θ. Taking 6 years as a
reasonable estimate of the full length of a business cycle implies that θ is
about 2.8% (a complete cycle requires the arrival of two θ-shocks). The dis-
count rate ρ is much smaller than the job destruction rate δ. Hence, little
is lost for our purpose by setting it equal to zero. The same applies to the
parameter x measuring the ratio of the coefficients of variation of λt and Xt.
Only the parameter σ must be estimated from the wage regression. Hence,
we have five overidentifying restrictions.
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The wage equation in Proposition 3 has an appealing interpretation. Con-
sider the second line in equation (8) for the special case Bt = Wt (1) = 0 for
t ∈ {u, d}. Integrating the equation and taking logs yields
lnWt (F ) = lnλt + ln
(∫ 1
F
Πt (f) df
)
.
Suppose that profits Πt (F ) are constant over the business cycle. Then, the
only reason for wages to vary over the cycle is the variation in the job offer
arrival rate λt: firms will offer lower wages, since workers are less likely to
quit. This effect has a unit elasticity: ω = 1. There are two reasons for
ω to be different from one, see equation (10). The first reason is the term
χ−θ
χ+θ
x in the numerator of ω. This reflects the effect of cyclical variation in
Xt (F ). When the job offer arrival rate is correlated to the monetary value
of output (x > 0), then profits decline during the downturn and hence firms
are less inclined to pay retention premiums to stop workers from quitting.
This raises ω above unity. The second reason for ω to be different from one
is the term θ
χ
(
χ−θ
χσ
+ 1
)
in the denominator. This term is the moderating
effect of wage rigidity on the firm’s wage setting policy during the upturn of
the economy. Firms don’t want to offer too high wages in the upturn, since
they cannot reduce their offers during the downturn. This reduces ω below
unity. For, x → 0 there is only variation in the job offer arrival rate and
not in the monetary value of output Xt (F ). This is the empirically relevant
case as λt varies by a factor two or more, while the monetary value of output
varies by at most a couple of percent. Hence, ω is less than one.
Our estimation results show σ to be 0.10 for low-educated workers and
0.14 for higher educated. Using these values for δ, θ, ρ and x and the value
of σ for lower educated, we obtain
ω ≡ 1 +
χ−θ
χ+θ
x
1 + θ
χ
(
χ−θ
χσ
+ 1
) ∼= 0.25, (11)
ζ ≡ θ
χσ
∼= 5.8.
The model therefore predicts that the elasticity ω of wages with respect to
the job offer arrival rate is substantially below unity, while the elasticity ζω
of the quit rate is above unity.
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3 Empirical results
3.1 Mismatch indicator
For the estimation of equation (10) we need information on the mismatch
indicator F , which is not directly observed. We use a proxy for that variable
using a method developed in Gottfries and Teulings (2016). We summarize
the main lines of their argument which, in turn, builds on Barlevy (2008)
and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2013). We follow Wolpin (1992) and refer to
the time elapsing between two consecutive layoffs as an employment cycle
(the first employment cycle starts at the beginning of a worker’s career).
Hence, a worker’s current employment cycle has started either at the last
layoff or -for the first employment cycle- at the start of the labour career.
We normalize our measure of calendar time t such that it takes the value
0 at the start of the first job of the current employment cycle. Note that
this definition of t excludes the preceding unemployment spell. We define Λt
to be the cumulative job offer arrival rate of a worker since the start of the
employment cycle:
Λt ≡
∫ t
0
λτdτ.
We refer to Λt as the labour market time elapsed since the start of the first
job of the current employment cycle. The clock of labour market time runs
faster relative to calendar time during the upturn, it runs slower during
the downturn. We define a and b as the start and end date respectively
of the current job; by construction, 0 ≤ a < b (a = 0 for the first job of
an employment cycle, a > 0 for subsequent jobs). Hence, Λa is the labour
market time elapsed since the start of the employment cycle until the start
of the current job; Λb is the labour market time elapsed at termination of
the current job. Let n denote the number of job offers received during the
current employment cycle until the end of the current job (hence: in the
time interval [0, b]). Gottfries and Teulings (2016) show that, in a model
with efficient transitions (such as the model with flexible wages in Section
2.2)
E [n] = Λb + 1, (12)
E [F ] = Λ−1b +O
(
Λ−2b
)
,
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for jobs ending by a layoff, while for jobs that end in a quit
E [n] = Λb + 1 +O(Λ
−1
b ), (13)
E [F ] = 2Λ−1b +O
(
Λ−2b
)
.
see Gottfries and Teulings (2016), Proposition 1. Their proposition follows
from the theory of order statistics. Conditional on the value of b, jobs ending
in a layoff have a lower expected mismatch than jobs ending in a quit, com-
pare equation (12) and (13). Intuitively, the information that a job ends by
a quit implies that some jobs are better and hence the job is not as a good
as one would otherwise expect. This implies that wages should be higher in
jobs ending by a layoff which is supported in data (Gottfries and Teulings,
2016).
In models with efficient job-to-job transitions, like the model with flexible
wages discussed in Section 2.2, the current job is simply the job offer with the
lowest mismatch that a worker has received since the start of the employment
cycle. For this class of models, equation (12) and (13) hold exactly. In a
model with inefficient transitions, like the model with downwardly rigid wages
discussed in Section 2.3, a worker might reject an incoming offer with a lower
mismatch because the wage in the current job is bound by downward rigidity.
The equations will not hold exactly in that case. However, while this has a
first order effect O (∆) on the quit rate, it has a second order effect O (∆2)
on the expected mismatch E[F |Λt]: the worker will only reject job offers in
the interval F new offer ∈ (F current job −O (∆) , F current job) where the reduction
in the mismatch by these “missed” job-to-job transitions is of the same order
F current job − F new offer = O (∆); hence, the effect on expected mismatch is of
a second order O (∆2). Moreover, this effect is transitory because as soon as
the worker accepts a new job (either during the current downswing or after
transition to the upswing), that new offer must by definition have a lower
mismatch than the current job, and hence the mismatch indicator is again
the best job offer that a worker has received since the start of the employment
cycle. Since the relations in Proposition 3 hold only up to a term of order
O (∆2), we can ignore this effect.
If wage offers follow a Pareto distribution, see equation (9), then the ex-
pected mismatch described in equation (12) and (13) can be easily translated
into an effect on the expected log wage. For layoffs, we obtain
E [lnWt|t ∈ [a, b)] ∼= σ ln (Λb + 1) , (14)
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while for quits
E [lnWt|t ∈ [a, b)] ∼= σ [ln (Λb + 1)− 1] . (15)
3.2 Regression specification
By equation (10) and (14), worker i’s log wage lnWit at time t satisfies
lnWit = βi+β
′Xit+σ [ln (Λib + 1)−Dquit]+ωλlnλt+ω lnλimax at+νia+ it.
(16)
where βi is an individual fixed effect, measuring unobserved general human
capital, where Xit is a vector measuring observed general human capital
obtained by either education or work experience that vary over time (constant
human capital variables are picked up by the worker fixed effect), where Dquit
is dummy for those jobs that end by a quit, where λimax at = maxτ∈[ai,t] λτ ,
where via is random job effect, and εit is a random transitory shock. Note
that while λt has the same value for all i at a particular time t, λimax at may
vary between i because their current jobs started at a different points in time.
This variation helps identifying the effect empirically.
We can now contrast our regression framework to that in Kudlyak (2011),
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2013) and Galindo da Fonseca et al. (2016). The
critical issue is how to account for the selectivity in the mismatch F . Sur-
viving jobs are more likely to have a lower mismatch (if not, the worker is
likely to have quit to a better match). Our specification is different for a
number of reasons. First, the foremost mentioned papers correct for mis-
match be entering both ln(Θa) and ln(Θb −Θa) in their specification, where
Θa refers to the integral of labour market tightness from 0 to a. Gottfries
and Teulings (2016) show that the correct specification is to enter ln(Λb+1).
A matching function would imply that market tightness should be raised to
some power in order to calculate the job finding rate. This is why we instead
measure labour market time using job finding rates. Furthermore, while
Λb = (Λb − Λa) + Λa, this equality does not hold for the sum of their logs.
Hence, the correct specification is not nested in their specification, causing
their estimates to be biased. Finally, we follow Gottfries and Teulings (2016)
and include a one in order to capture the initial offer and a dummy for jobs
ending via a quit, see that paper for a more detailed discussion.
For the log quit rate, we estimate a logit model for the probability that
a worker quits during the current time period conditional on the observed
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history at the moment of observation. This yields consistent estimates of the
parameter of the model for the log quit rate.
ln qit = β
′
qXit − χF ln (Λit + 1) + (1 + ζω) lnλt − ζω lnλimax at + εq,it (17)
When we estimate the above equation we include quadratic experience and
years of education and a linear time trend, as well as dummies for region,
marriage, and urban versus rural location in the vector Xit.
Note that mismatch indicator applied in both equation differs slightly.
In equation (16), we apply cumulative labour market time up till the ter-
mination date b of the current job, ln (Λib + 1), while in equation (17) we
apply cumulative labour market time up till the moment of observation,
ln (Λit + 1). This difference follows from econometric theory: ln (Λib + 1) is
the best available estimate for − lnF , ln (Λit + 1) is the best estimate of the
effect of past employment history on the current quite rate. One can show
that the estimation of the logit model in equation (17) is asymptotically
equivalent to maximum likelihood estimation of the job-to-job hazard rate
under the model’s assumption that the layoff rate is constant over time.
One can dispute whether or not both equations should include controls
for tenure. As it stands, the model does not include a tenure profile in wages,
see Gottfries and Teulings (2016) for a more extensive discussion, nor does
the quit rate depend on tenure. However, log duration of the employment
cycle ln (Λit + 1) is positively correlated to tenure. By not including tenure,
we might therefore incorrectly attribute the effect of tenure to ln Λt. Hence,
we present all estimation both with and without a quadratic in tenure. All
standard errors are clustered at the job level.
3.3 Data
Like Gottfries and Teulings (2016), we use the cross-sectional sample from
NLSY79 over the years from 1979 to 2012. Our selections are identical to
Gottfries and Teulings (2016), to which we refer to the details of the data-
selection process. Since women tend to interrupt their working career for
childbearing, which is not described in our model, we select only males.
Similarly, since our model applies to primary jobs, the sample is restricted to
the primary jobs for men over the age of 18 who are not enrolled in full-time
education. Jobs for which weekly hours is less than 15 and which lasted less
than four weeks or started before 1979 are excluded from the sample. When
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there are multiple jobs, the primary job is defined as the job with highest
number of hours. Jobs with inconsistencies in their start and end date are
adjusted or removed. If schooling is not reported for a given month, we
assign the maximum from the previous months; if it is less than previously
reported, we use the maximum previously reported.
For the construction of the variable Λb, we classify job terminations into
either quits (belonging to the same employment cycle) or layoffs (starting
a new cycle). Here, we follow Barlevy (2008). A separation is defined as a
quit when the new job starts within eight weeks of the termination of the
previous job and the stated reason for separation is voluntary. This definition
is used to determine whether or not two consecutive jobs belong to the same
employment cycle.
Having defined employment cycles, we have to decide which jobs to in-
clude in our analysis of jobs. We exclude jobs which have not ended. Jobs
end if the worker reports that he no longer works at the job, if the job be-
comes a secondary job or if the worker at an interview during the subsequent
year does not mention working for the firm during the past year. Jobs where
the worker reports being self-employed or working for a family business, or
where the hourly wage is below $1 or above $500, or where some of the co-
variates are missing values are dropped from the analysis. Wages are deflated
using seasonally adjusted national CPI (CPIAUCSL). In order to calculate
the transition rate to new jobs we create a monthly labour force record for
the workers. The transition rate is calculated using the probability that the
worker experiences a quit within a month.
The variable λt is the monthly job finding rate for unemployed workers,
which is calculated from the transition rate from unemployment to employ-
ment. Since the model implies that unemployed job seekers accept any job
offer, the transition rate out of unemployment is a perfect measure of λt.
We calculate the transition rates using the monthly CPS data. We restrict
our analysis to a sample of males aged 25-54 in order to match our NLSY
79 dataset and to avoid moves involving voluntary participation decisions
as opposed to job-offer arrivals.3 To calculate the job-finding rate of the
unemployed, we calculate the fraction of the workers who are unemployed
less than five weeks and are employed in the next month. In our empirical
application we allow for on-the-job search to be less efficient than off-the-
3We match the monthly CPS using variables suggested by Drew and Warren (2014).
In addition, we use race and age as extra controls.
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job search. We assume the job offer arrival rate for employed job seekers to
be a fraction ψ ∈ [0, 1] of the job offer arrival rate for the unemployed, see
Gottfries and Teulings (2016) for details; they report ψ to be equal to 0.20.
3.4 Results on wages
Panel A of Table 1 reports the estimation results for equation (16) excluding
a second order polynomial in tenure. We present the result for all data
combined, and for low and highly educated workers separately. Low and
high educated workers refers to those with 12 years or less and more than 12
years of education, respectively. The effect of match quality ln (Λib + 1) on
log wages is highly significant. The estimated coefficient σ measures the scale
parameter, in the Gumbel distribution, for the wage offer distribution of log
wages. In line with Gottfries and Teulings (2016), this standard deviation is
higher for higher educated than for low-educated workers. The effect of the
current job offer arrival rate lnλt is significant only if one does not control
for the maximum of the arrival rate since the job-start, lnλimax at. As soon
as lnλimax at is entered as a regressor, lnλt becomes insignificant or weakly
significant at best, which is consistent with Proposition 3: ωλ = 0. The
coefficient for lnλimax at is highly significant, which is also consistent with
Proposition 3. The estimated value of 0.15 has the right order of magnitude,
see equation (11), where we calculated a value of 0.25.
Panel B reports the estimation results including the polynomial on tenure.
The results are virtually identical. Hence, the match quality indicator ln (Λib + 1)
does not serve as a proxy for tenure. Strictly speaking, the model predicts
that there is no tenure profile in wages. The F-test falls substantially when
lnλimax at is included. This captures the fact that, lnλimax at, in expectation
has a similar behavior to tenure, starting at zero and then rising during the
time in the job. The restriction that the coefficients on tenure are zero, is
therefore strongly rejected by the data. However, Gottfries and Teulings
(2016) show that the return to tenure contributes less than 10% to the total
increase in log wages over the career. The F-test show that part of this re-
turn to tenure is due to the effect of lnλimax at (which is weakly increasing in
tenure by construction): the test statistic falls substantially when lnλimax at
is included as an additional regressor.
Recall that our model predicts that firms pay retention premiums, but no
hiring premiums. Consider the alternative case, where firms pay both hiring
and retention premiums. In that case, a firm would not find it profitable to
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Table 1: Wage regressions
Without Tenure
All Data All Data Low-Edu. Low-Edu. High-Edu. High-Edu.
lnλt 0.064∗∗∗ 0.015 0.084∗∗∗ 0.033∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.013
(0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.027) (0.027)
ln(Λb + 1) 0.098
∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
lnλimax at 0.224
∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.027) (0.043)
Observations 33386 33386 20885 20885 11722 11722
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
With Tenure
All Data All Data Low-Edu. Low-Edu. High-Edu. High-Edu.
lnλt 0.068∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗ 0.028
(0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.027) (0.027)
ln(Λb + 1) 0.084
∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
lnλimax at 0.163
∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.029) (0.047)
Observations 33386 33386 20885 20885 11722 11722
F-test 51.9 24 31.5 14.2 15.1 6.9
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2: Wage regressions
Without Tenure
All Data All Data All Data Low-Edu. Low-Edu. Low-Edu. High-Edu. High-Edu. High-Edu.
lnλt 0.059∗∗∗ 0.015 0.013 0.077∗∗∗ 0.034∗ 0.031 0.054∗∗ 0.012 0.008
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
lnλia 0.068
∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.096∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.005 0.012 0.031 -0.042 -0.191∗∗
(0.019) (0.021) (0.046) (0.023) (0.025) (0.173) (0.037) (0.039) (0.087)
ln(Λb + 1) 0.098
∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
lnλimax at 0.226
∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.218 0.251∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.048) (0.029) (0.149) (0.045) (0.090)
(lnλimax at − lnλa)2 -0.189∗∗ -0.108 -0.304∗
(0.085) (0.131) (0.156)
Observations 33386 33386 33386 20885 20885 20885 11722 11722 11722
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
With Tenure
All Data All Data All Data Low-Edu. Low-Edu. Low-Edu. High-Edu. High-Edu. High-Edu.
lnλt 0.062∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.028 0.023
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027)
lnλia 0.078
∗∗∗ 0.030 -0.081∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.036 -0.044 0.041 -0.013 -0.178∗∗
(0.020) (0.022) (0.046) (0.023) (0.026) (0.054) (0.037) (0.040) (0.088)
ln(Λb + 1) 0.083
∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
lnλimax at 0.144
∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.049) (0.033) (0.058) (0.050) (0.092)
(lnλimax at − lnλa)2 -0.229∗∗∗ -0.168 -0.340∗∗
(0.086) (0.105) (0.158)
Observations 33386 33386 33386 20885 20885 20885 11722 11722 11722
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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increase its wage offer when the arrival rate of outside offers increases only
slightly. The firm’s wage offer at the date of hiring included both hiring and
retention premiums. Since hiring is completed, the firm has no incentive
to continue paying the premium apart from its implicit or explicit contrac-
tual obligation. When the optimal retention premium goes up due to an
increase in the arrival rate of outside offers, the firm has first to deplete
this buffer of by now useless hiring premiums, before it becomes profitable
for the firm to raise its wage offer for ongoing jobs. This has two empirical
implications. First, lnλimax at only becomes relevant for the wage at time t
when it is substantially above than the log arrival rate at the date of hiring,
lnλia. We can test this by adding three variables to the regression: lnλia
and (lnλimax at − lnλia)2. If firms were to pay hiring premiums, the arrival
rate at the date of hiring lnλia should drive out the maximum arrival rate
lnλimax at, while (lnλimax at − lnλia)2 captures the fact that lnλimax at comes
in only when it is substantially above lnλia. Hence, (lnλimax at − lnλia)2
and lnλia should come in with a positive coefficient, while lnλimax at should
be insignificant. These predictions are tested in Table 2. In the regressions
lnλimax at crowds out lnλia, consistent with retention premiums only. The
term (lnλimax at − lnλia)2 is significant is some of the regressions but has the
opposite sign is expected from a model with hiring premiums. Again, com-
paring Panel A and B, the conclusion does not depend on whether or not
controls for tenure are included in the model.
We conclude that the model with downwardly rigid wages fits the data on
wages very well. The key variable lnλimax at has the right sign and is highly
significant for both education levels and all coefficients have the right order
of magnitude. Moreover, the evidence suggests that firms do not pay hiring
premiums.
3.5 Results on the quit rate
Table 4 reports the estimation results for a logit model for the probability
that a worker quits from her current job. The coefficients of this logit model
converge to the coefficients of the log quit rate in equation (17). In both pan-
els, we report the estimation results for models ex- and including lnλimax at,
measuring the inefficiency in job-to-job transitions during the downturn. In
fact, lnλimax at can be interpreted as an instrument for the effect of cyclical
variation in wages. In that interpretation, equation (16) is the first stage
regression. The estimation results, discussed in the previous section, show
27
the instrument to be highly relevant. Then, equation (17) is the second stage
regression. First, we consider Panel A without controls for tenure. The coeffi-
cient ln (Λit + 1) varies roughly between 0.60 and 0.80, being somewhat lower
for models in- rather than excluding lnλimax at as a regressor. Proposition 3
predicts the coefficient on ln (Λit + 1) to be equal to unity. The coefficient
has therefore the right order of magnitude, but is lower then its expected
theoretical value. Recall that our estimate for Λit is based on the observed
transition rate from unemployment to employment, presuming that the job
offer arrival rate for employed job seekers varies proportionally to that for
unemployed. The lower coefficient could therefore be due to an imperfect
correlation between both job offer arrival rates. The surprise is that the
model works for wages but not for quits. The coefficient on lnλt is around
0.30 for specifications including lnλimax at, while it is between 0.70 and 0.80
for specifications including lnλimax at. The predicted value of this coefficient
is greater than unity for a model including lnλimax at, see Proposition 3. The
coefficient between 0.70 and 0.80 for the specification that do control for
lnλimax at therefore smaller than predicted. The key coefficient on lnλimax at
has the right sign and is highly significant. Proposition 3 predicts this coef-
ficient to be −ζω = −5.8× 0.25 = −1.45. The estimation results are closely
in line with this prediction.
The results in Panel B are less favorable. When we add controls for
tenure, all coefficients drop in absolute value and the coefficient on the match
quality indicator ln (Λit + 1) becomes weakly significant at best. However,
the key coefficient on lnλimax at remains highly significant. By construction,
Λit is highly correlated to tenure, if only because the tenure in the current
job can never exceed the length of employment cycle up till the moment
of observation. Moreover, the model predicts the most recent job in the
employment cycle to have the longest expected duration, strengthening the
positive correlation. However, the model predicts that ln (Λit + 1) would
drive out tenure. In fact, the opposite happens. We have no good explanation
for this.
The model with downwardly rigid wages fits the data on the cyclical
behavior of quit rates well, though the coefficients is too small. The key
variable lnλimax at has the right sign and magnitude and is highly significant
for both education levels. As soon as controls for tenure are added to the
specification, these covariates drive out ln (Λit + 1).
Overall, the model fits the data surprisingly well. The model yields
five overidentifying restrictions on the six coefficients for the key variables,
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Table 3: Logit regressions for quits
Without Tenure
All Data All Data Low-Edu. Low-Edu. High-Edu. High-Edu.
lnλt 0.323∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 0.290∗ 0.764∗∗∗ 0.372∗ 0.803∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.150) (0.164) (0.194) (0.210) (0.238)
log(Λt + 1) -0.821∗∗∗ -0.644∗∗∗ -0.866∗∗∗ -0.693∗∗∗ -0.736∗∗∗ -0.575∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.041) (0.044) (0.056) (0.050) (0.060)
lnλimax at -1.665
∗∗∗ -1.549∗∗∗ -1.622∗∗∗
(0.199) (0.268) (0.299)
Observations 340007 340007 199022 199022 131174 131174
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
With Tenure
All Data All Data Low-Edu. Low-Edu. High-Edu. High-Edu.
lnλt 0.242∗ 0.529∗∗∗ 0.191 0.453∗∗ 0.306 0.582∗∗
(0.128) (0.146) (0.163) (0.189) (0.209) (0.233)
log(Λt + 1) -0.160∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗ -0.095 -0.053 -0.217∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗
(0.046) (0.045) (0.063) (0.062) (0.067) (0.066)
lnλimax at -0.951
∗∗∗ -0.828∗∗∗ -0.995∗∗∗
(0.190) (0.254) (0.286)
Observations 340007 340007 199022 199022 131174 131174
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4: Logit regressions for quits: subsequent jobs
Without Tenure
All Data All Data Low-Edu. Low-Edu. High-Edu. High-Edu.
lnλt 0.573∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗ 1.015∗∗∗ 0.348 0.630
(0.256) (0.273) (0.348) (0.375) (0.388) (0.406)
log(Λt + 1) -0.768∗∗∗ -0.662∗∗∗ -0.828∗∗∗ -0.740∗∗∗ -0.705∗∗∗ -0.594∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.080) (0.098) (0.113) (0.109) (0.118)
lnλimax at -1.200
∗∗∗ -0.972∗ -1.328∗∗∗
(0.371) (0.559) (0.489)
Observations 91018 91018 48078 48078 40152 40152
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
With Tenure
All Data All Data Low-Edu. Low-Edu. High-Edu. High-Edu.
lnλt 0.525∗∗ 0.516∗∗ 0.737∗∗ 0.570 0.297 0.426
(0.254) (0.263) (0.346) (0.359) (0.385) (0.397)
log(Λt + 1) -0.294∗∗∗ -0.295∗∗∗ -0.250∗∗ -0.271∗∗ -0.361∗∗∗ -0.346∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.081) (0.109) (0.111) (0.124) (0.124)
lnλimax at 0.038 0.635 -0.569
(0.370) (0.548) (0.498)
Observations 91018 91018 48078 48078 40152 40152
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
ln (Λit + 1) , lnλt and lnλimax at in the models for both log wages and the quit
rate. The sign of all six estimated coefficients fits the prediction in Proposi-
tion 3 for all three versions of the model (high and low-educated, and both
groups combined). When predicted to be different from zero, the coefficients
are mostly highly significant and they have roughly the magnitude predicted
in Proposition 3, except for the coefficient on lnλt in the logit model for the
quit rate.
4 Conclusion
The ordeal of a job seeker is not much different from that of the mythological
character Sisyphos. Sisyphos has to role a heavy boulder up on a steep hill.
Each time when he has almost reached the top, the boulder slips out of his
30
hands, rolling down the slope and crushing anything that is along its pathway.
Afterwards, Sisyphos has no other choice then starting its laborious task all
over again. This fate looks very much similar to that of a job seeker in an
OJS model by Burdett and Mortensen (1998). Job seekers climb the hill of
rents by hopping from on job to another. Their ultimate goal is the most
productive and hence best paying job, on the top of the hill. Just when they
almost reached the top, an unexpected job destruction shocks throws them
off its slopes, back in the deep trough of unemployment. This leaves them
no alternative than to restart their ascent from the lowest rungs of the hill
of rents.
In our previous paper Gottfries and Teulings (2016), we have shown that
the steady state version of this model has all first-order predictions on wage
dynamics and job-to-job mobility right. Job seekers do gradually climb the
hill of rents by selecting the ever better draws from the offer distribution.
They face a layoff every now and then, after which they have to restart this
selection process again, receiving draws from largely the same offer distribu-
tion as during their first attempt to climb the ladder. The randomness of
this process explains some 9% of total wage dispersion.
This paper shows that this model is also useful to study the long-standing
problem of the aggregate wage rigidity. Firms seek to credibly commit to a
posted wage in order to convince workers not to quit. The necessity to com-
mit provides a forceful motive for wage-rigidity. Remarkably, the literature
has largely avoided this idea, either by using search models without OJS, as
in Shimer (2004) and Hall (2005), or by tweaking the model such that the
posted wages can respond flexibly to aggregate shocks, as in Moscarini and
Postel-Vinay (2013) and Coles and Mortensen (2016). Until so far, no paper
has analyzed the models with OJS, wage rigidity and inefficient job-to-job
transitions, probably because these model are complicated. This paper fills
the gap by using the wage posting model to analyze the implications of wage
rigidity.
This model yields inefficiently low job-to-job transitions during the down-
turn because workers reject outside offers that are more productive than
their current job. The theoretical structure in the model is derived from
first principles. It yields two simple linear relations, for log wages and for
quits respectively. The over-identifying restrictions implied by the theoret-
ical structure hold surprisingly well. To our knowledge, this model is the
first model with OJS and wage rigidity that derives prediction regarding the
degree of wage cyclicality from a theoretical structure and that yield micro-
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predictions which are supported reasonably well by the data. In particular,
downward rigid in wages is supported empirically looking at both wages and
quit rates.
Until now, macro-economics has largely relied on search models without
OJS. Our paper shows that this is the wrong benchmark. The main impli-
cations of our model contrast sharply from standard models used till so far.
When a negative shock hits the (nominal) value of output, wages in ongoing
jobs are bound by downward rigidity, unlike wages in new jobs. Nevertheless,
a downward shock has a negative effect on vacancy creation, not so much due
to the fall in the nominal value of output, but due to a commitment problem.
Employed job seekers correctly expect firms not to pay high wages, because
the job offer arrival rate is low. Hence, workers are reluctant to give up their
high paying job. Hence, fewer vacancies are opened. The lower job offer
arrival rate allows other firms that open new vacancies to offer lower wages
because worker retention is less of an problem. Only in course of time, jobs
of which the wages are set before the onset of the recession are faced out
by gradual job destruction. Then, the economy converges gradually to its
new steady state equilibrium. The economy suffers from a collective action
problem. Firms cannot commit to pay high wages. In turn, this makes hiring
harder which further weakens the incentive to pay higher wages. Uncovering
the details of these dynamics is fertile avenue for future research.
References
Akerlof, G. A. and J. L. Yellen (1985): “Can Small Deviations from
Rationality Make Significant Differences to Economic Equilibria?” Amer-
ican Economic Review, 75, 708–720.
Baker, G., M. Gibbs, and B. Holmstrom (1994): “The Wage Policy
of a Firm,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 921–955.
Barlevy, G. (2008): “Identification of Search Models using Record Statis-
tics,” The Review of Economic Studies, 75, 29–64.
Bauer, A. and B. Lochner (2016): “History Dependence in Wages and
the Role of Match Quality: Evidence from Germany,” .
Beaudry, P. and J. DiNardo (1991): “The Effect of Implicit Contracts
32
on the Movement of Wages over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Micro
Data,” Journal of Political Economy, 99, 665–88.
Bellou, A. and B. Kaymak (2016): “The Cyclical Behavior of Job Qual-
ity and Real Wage Growth,” .
Bewley, T. F. (1999): Why wages don’t fall during a recession, Harvard
University Press.
Bils, M. J. (1985): “Real Wages over the Business Cycle: Evidence from
Panel Data,” Journal of Political Economy, 93, 666–89.
Bontemps, C., J.-M. Robin, and G. V. den Berg (2000): “Equilib-
rium Search with Continuous Productivity Dispersion: Theory and Non-
parametric Estimation,” International Economic Review, 41, pp. 305–358.
Burdett, K. and D. T. Mortensen (1998): “Wage differentials, em-
ployer size, and unemployment,” International Economic Review, 257–273.
Campbell, III, C. M. and K. S. Kamlani (1997): “The Reasons for
Wage Rigidity: Evidence from a Survey of Firms,” The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 112, 759.
Card, D. and D. Hyslop (1997): “Does Inflation ”Grease the Wheels
of the Labor Market”?” in Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, NBER Chapters, 71–122.
Carlsson, M. and A. Westermark (2016): “Endogenous Separations,
Wage Rigidities and Employment Volatility,” .
Coles, M. G. (2001): “Equilibrium wage dispersion, firm size, and growth,”
Review of Economic Dynamics, 4, 159–187.
Coles, M. G. and D. T. Mortensen (2016): “Equilibrium Labor
Turnover, Firm Growth, and Unemployment,” Econometrica, 84, 347–363.
Drew, Julia A. Rivera, S. F. and J. R. Warren (2014): “Making full
use of the longitudinal design of the Current Population Survey: Methods
for linking records across 16 months,” Journal of Economic and Social
Measurement, 39, 121 –144.
33
Elsby, M. W., B. Hobijn, and A. S¸ahin (2015): “On the importance of
the participation margin for labor market fluctuations,” Journal of Mon-
etary Economics, 72, 64–82.
Elsby, M. W., R. Michaels, and G. Solon (2009): “The ins and outs of
cyclical unemployment,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
1, 84–110.
Fujita, S. and G. Ramey (2009): “The cyclicality of separation and job
finding rates,” International Economic Review, 50, 415–430.
Galindo da Fonseca, J. A., G. Gallipoli, and Y. Yedid-Levi
(2016): “Revisiting the Relationship Between Unemployment and Wages,”
Tech. rep., Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
Gautier, P. A., C. N. Teulings, and A. Van Vuuren (2010): “On-
the-Job Search, Mismatch and Efficiency,” The Review of Economic Stud-
ies, 77, 245–272.
Gertler, M., C. Huckfeldt, and A. Trigari (2016): “Unemployment
fluctuations, match quality, and the wage cyclicality of new hires,” Tech.
rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.
Gottfries, A. (2017): “Bargaining with renegotiation in models with on-
the-job search,” Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1725, Faculty
of Economics, University of Cambridge.
Gottfries, A. and C. N. Teulings (2016): “Returns to On-the-Job
Search and the Dispersion of Wages,” Tinbergen Institute Discussion Pa-
pers 16-080/VI, Tinbergen Institute.
Hagedorn, M. and I. Manovskii (2013): “Job Selection and Wages over
the Business Cycle,” The American Economic Review, 103, pp. 771–803.
Hall, R. E. (2005): “Employment fluctuations with equilibrium wage stick-
iness,” American economic review, 95, 50–65.
Hart, O. and J. Moore (2008): “Contracts as Reference Points,” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123, 1–48.
Kudlyak, M. (2011): “Wages over the Business Cycle Revisited: History-
Dependent or Spot,” mineo.
34
Lise, J. and J.-M. Robin (2017): “The Macrodynamics of Sorting between
Workers and Firms,” The American Economic Review, 107, 1104–1135.
Marimon, R. and F. Zilibotti (1999): “Unemployment vs. Mismatch of
Talents: Reconsidering Unemployment Benefits,” Economic Journal, 109,
266–291.
Menzio, G. and S. Shi (2011): “Efficient search on the job and the business
cycle,” Journal of Political Economy, 119, 468–510.
Mortensen, D. T. and C. A. Pissarides (1994): “Job Creation and
Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment,” Review of Economic
Studies, 61, 397–415.
Moscarini, G. and F. Postel-Vinay (2013): “Stochastic Search Equi-
librium,” Review of Economic Studies, 80, 1545–1581.
Shimer, R. (2004): “The Consequences of Rigid Wages in Search Models,”
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2, 469–479.
——— (2005): “The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and
Vacancies,” American Economic Review, 95, 25–49.
——— (2012): “Reassessing the Ins and Outs of Unemployment,” Review of
Economic Dynamics, 15, 127–148.
Wolpin, K. I. (1992): “The Determinants of Black-White Differences in
Early Employment Careers: Search, Layoffs, Quits, and Endogenous Wage
Growth,” Journal of Political Economy, 100, pp. 535–560.
35
A Proofs
Preliminary steps, conjecturing the differentiability W∆
• We leave out the argument F of all functions.
• We conjecture that the solution for Wu and Wd takes the following form
Wd = W exp
[
−1
2
ω∆ +O
(
∆2
)
+O (F )
]
, (18)
Wu = W exp
[
1
2
ω∆ +O
(
∆2
)
+O (F )
]
,
where ω is a parameter that has to be determined. At the end of the
proof, we show that this conjecture is correct.
• Equation (9) and (18) imply
W∆
W
= ω +O (∆) +O (F ) , (19)
FW ′∆
W
= −σω +O (∆) +O (F ) ,
FX
W
=
σ
λ
(χ− θ) +O (∆) +O (F ) .
• Equation (7) implies Wu = Wud (Wd) < Wd+ (Wd) < Wd. Since Wu −
Wd = W∆∆, this implies
Wd+ (Wd) = Wu +O (∆) = Wd +O (∆) , (20)
W ′d+ (Wd) = 1 +O (∆) .
Step 1: derivation of expressions for V o′u (Wu) and V
o′′
u (Wu)
• Equation (2) and (6) apply identically for all W . Hence, their deriva-
tives must apply. For the first derivatives we obtain:
[χ+ λuFu (W )]V
o′
u (W ) = 1 + θV
o′
d+(W ),[
χ+ λdFd
(
W−1d+ (W )
)]
V o′d+ (W ) = 1 + θV
o′
u (W ) ,
and for the second derivatives:
[χ+ λuFu (W )]V
o′′
u (W ) = θV
o′′
d+(W )−λuuu (W )V o′u (W ),[
χ+ λdFd
(
W−1d+ (W )
)]
V o′′d+ (W ) = θV
o′′
u (W )− λdud
(
W−1d+ (W )
)
W−1
′
d+ (W )V
o′
d+ (W ) .
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• We evaluate these equations for W = Wu, using Fu (Wu) = F, λu−λd =
O (∆), fu (Wu) = W
′
u
−1 (see equation (1)) and
Fd
[
W−1d+ (Wu)
]
= F +O (∆) ,
fd
[
W−1d+ (W )
]
W−1
′
d+ (W ) = fu (Wu) +O (∆) ,
due to equation (20). The solution of the first derivatives for V o′u (Wu)
and V o′d+ (W ) reads:
V o′u (Wu) = V
o′
d+ (W ) = (χ− θ + λF )−1 +O (∆) , (21)
while the equations for the second derivatives simplify to
λ (χ− θ + λF )−1 + (χ+ λF )V o′′u (W )W ′u = θV o′′d+(W )W ′u +O (∆) ,
λ (χ− θ + λF )−1 + (χ+ λF )V o′′d+ (W )W ′u = θV o′′u (W )W ′u +O (∆) .
which can be solved for V o′′u (Wu) and V
o′′
d+ (W ):
V o′′u (Wu)W
′
u = −λ (χ− θ + λF )−2 +O (∆) . (22)
Step 2: use Step 1 for the derivation of Wd+ (W ) and W
′
d+ (W )
• Equation (5) applies identically for all W and hence its first derivative
with respect to W must apply, which reads:
W ′d+ (W )− 1 = θ
(
V o′u [Wud (W )]W
′
ud (W )− V o′u [Wd+ (W )]W ′d+ (W )
)
.
• We evaluate equation (5) and its derivative above for W = Wd. A first
order Taylor expansion of V ou (Wu) and V
o′
u (Wu) yields
Wd+ (Wd)−Wd = θV o′u (Wu) [W∆∆ +Wd −Wd+ (Wd)] +O
(
∆2
)
, (23)
W ′d+ (Wd)− 1 = θV o′u (Wu)
[
W ′∆∆/W
′
d + 1−W ′d+ (Wd)
]
−θV o′′u (Wu) [W∆∆ +Wd −Wd+ (Wd)]W ′d+ (Wd) +O
(
∆2
)
.
We use the definitional relations Wud (Wd) ≡ Wu ≡ W∆∆ + Wd and
hence W ′ud (Wd) = W
′
∆∆/W
′
d + 1.
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• Substitution of equation (21) and (22) in equation (23) and using equa-
tion (20) yields
Wd+ (Wd)−Wd = θ
χ+ λF
W∆∆ +O
(
∆2
)
, (24)
W ′d+ (Wd)− 1 =
θ
χ+ λF
(
W ′∆ +
λ
χ+ λF
W∆
)
∆
W
′ +O
(
∆2
)
.
Step 3: derivation of W−1d+ (W ) and W
−1′
d+ (W ) from Step 2
• Since W ′d+ (Wd) = 1 +O (∆) (see equation (20)), equation (24) implies
W−1d+ (Wu)−Wu = W−1d+ (Wd)−Wd +O
(
∆2
)
(25)
= Wd −Wd+ (Wd) +O
(
∆2
)
= − θ
χ+ λF
W∆∆ +O
(
∆2
)
,
W−1d+ (Wu)−Wd =
χ− θ + λF
χ+ λF
W∆∆ +O
(
∆2
)
,
W−1′d+ (Wu)− 1 = W−1′d+ (Wd)− 1 +O
(
∆2
)
= 1−W ′d+ (Wd) +O
(
∆2
)
= − θ
χ+ λF
(
W ′∆ +
λ
χ+ λF
W∆
)
∆
W
′ +O
(
∆2
)
.
Step 4: derivation of an expression for ΠdWW
• The expression for Πod in equation (2) holds identically for allW . Hence,
its derivatives with respect to W must hold.
[χ+ λdFd (W )] Π
o
dW (F,W ) + λdfd(W )Π
o
d(F,W ) = −1,
[χ+ λdFd (W )] Π
o
dWW (F,W ) + 2λdfd(W )Π
o
dW (F,W ) + λdf
′
d(W )Π
o
d(F,W ) = 0.
• Evaluating the last expression for W = Wd, using the envelope theorem
result ΠdW = 0 and substitution of equation (1) for f
′
d(W ) yields
ΠdWW =
λdΠd
χ+ λdF
W ′′d
W ′3d
= − 1
χ+ λF
W
′′
W
′2 +O (∆) . (26)
where we use W ′d = −λdΠd, see Proposition 2.
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Step 5: substitution of Step 3 and 4 in Πd+ and Πd+W
• Using equation (25) and (26), Πod+ (F,Wu) and its first derivative with
respect to Wu can be written as
Πod+ (F,Wu) = Πd +
1
2
ΠdWW
[
W−1d+ (Wu)−Wd
]2
(27)
+
[
χ+ λdFd(W
−1
d+ (Wu))
]−1 [
W−1d+ (Wu)−Wu
]
+O
(
∆3
)
= Πd − θ
(χ+ λF )2
W∆∆ +O
(
∆2
)
,
Πod+W (F,Wu) = ΠdWW
[
W−1d+ (Wu)−Wd
]
W−1′d+ (Wu)
+
[
χ+ λdFd(W
−1
d+ (Wu))
]−1 [
W−1′d+ (Wu)− 1
]
+λdfd
[
W−1d+ (Wu)
] W−1′d+ (Wu)[
χ+ λdFd(W
−1
d+ (Wu))
]2 [W−1d+ (Wu)−Wu]
= − θ
(χ+ λF )2
(
χ− θ + λF
θ
W
′′
W
′W∆ +W
′
∆ − 2
λ
χ+ λF
W∆
)
∆
W
′
+O
(
∆2
)
.
Step 6: substitution of equation (9) in equation (27)
• Using equation (9) for W ′ and W ′′ and using equation (19) for W∆ and
W ′∆, we obtain
Πd+ − Πd
∆W
= − θ
χ2
ω +O (∆) +O (F ) , (28)
Πd+W
∆
=
θ
σχ2
(
χ− θ
θ
(σ + 1) + σ
)
ω +O (∆) +O (F ) .
Step 7: derivation of equation (8)
• The Bellman equations for the firm’s profit in Proposition 2 can be
written as
(χ+ λuF ) Πu = X(1 +
∆
2
x)−Wu + θΠd+ +O(∆2),
(χ+ λdF ) Πd = X(1− ∆
2
x)−Wd + θΠu +O(∆2).
39
• Adding and substracting and division by ∆ yields the first pair of equa-
tions in (8)
(χ− θ + λF ) Π = X −W +O(∆),
(χ+ θ + λF ) Π∆ + λFΠ = xX −W∆ + θΠd+ − Πd
∆
+O(∆).
• The second pair of equations in (8) can be derived similarly
−W ′ = λΠ +O(∆),
−W ′∆ = λΠ∆ + λΠ + θ
Πd+W
∆
W
′
+O(∆).
• Hence, ω satisfies
ω =
1 + χ−θ
χ+θ
x
1 + θ
χ
(
χ−θ
χσ
+ 1
) .
• Substitution in equation (18) and taking logs yields Proposition 3. This
also confirms the initial conjecture regarding the functional form of
Wt (F ).
Step 8: derivation of the quit rate for jobs started in the upturn
•
qd+ = λdFd
[
W−1d+ (Wu)
]
= λdF + λd
dF
dW
[
W−1d+ (Wu)−Wu
]
+O
(
∆2
)
= λdF − λd F
σW
θ
χ+ λF
W∆∆ +O
(
∆2
)
= λdF
[
1− θ
σχ
ω∆
]
+O
(
∆2
)
+O (F ) ,
where we use equation (23) in the second line and equation (19) in the
third line.
• Taking logs yields Proposition 3.
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